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NOTES AND COMMENTS

from lack of counsel, most of the circumstances would seem to indi-

cate an independent confession.
In confession cases the court is faced with the problem of the
balancing of civil liberties with the need for effective police protection." The idea of a coerced confession is abhorrent. On the
other hand, the guilty should not escape punishment because of a
mere technicality. In the principal case individual rights are weighed
heavily at the expense of police effectiveness. If the spirit of this
decision is followed the McNabb-Mallory rule is clearly in no danger
of being circumvented by post-arraignment police activities.
CHARLES M.

WHEDBEE

Criminal Procedure-Continuance
It is the policy of the law that controversies should be settled as
speedily as possible.1 In criminal cases this right is guaranteed to
the accused by the constitution.' However, undue speed may often
work as much or more injustice as unnecessary delay.' To insure a
prisoner adequate time to prepare his defense a continuance may
often be necessary. In a criminal trial in North Carolina the granting or denial of a motion for a continuance of a case to another term
or until later in the same term is a decision which rests within the
sound discretion of the trial judge.4 Normally continuance of a
criminal case is not favored.5
The statutory pattern for continuance of any cause is extremely
broad. 6 Generally, continuances may be granted if the judge is
satisfied that though the applicant has diligently prepared his case,
it would be impossible for the moving party to have a fair trial at
the present term for reasons beyond his control. No universal
enumeration of the grounds for a continuance is possible, since the
sufficiency of the cause is dependent upon and interwoven with the
" See Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449, 453 (1957).
'Piedmont Wagon Co. v. Bostic, 118 N.C. 758, 24 S.E. 525 (1896).
'U.S. CoNsT. amend. VI.
'State v. Creech, 229 N.C. 662, 677, 51 S.E.2d 348, 359 (1949) (dissent).
' State v. Flowers, 244 N.C. 77, 92 S.E.2d 447 (1956); State v. Ipock,
242 N.C. 119, 86 S.E.2d 798 (1955); State v. Hackney, 240 N.C. 230, 81
S.E.2d 778 (1954).
' State v. Gibson, 229 N.C. 497, 50 S.E.2d 520 (1948).

'N.C.

GEN. STAT.

§ 1-175 (Supp. 1961).

§§ 1-175 to -176 (1950), as amended, N.C.

GEN. STAT.
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facts of the case.7 No appeal will lie from continuing a cause, and
in the case of an order refusing continuance, the court will not
reverse unless the judge has plainly abused his discretion.'
An exception to this general rule applies when the motion for
continuance is based upon the constitutional rights of the accused
to confront his accuser and to have representation of counsel.' When
based upon a constitutional right, the motion ceases to be a matter
of discretion and becomes a question of law, and appeal will lie from
a refusal to grant the motion.' 0 In the recent case of State v. Lane 1
the defendant was indicted for a crime against nature. The judge
on his own motion appointed counsel for the indigent accused at
10:30 A.M. The case was tried at 2:30 P.M. on the same day.
Counsel moved for a continuance contending that he had not had
adequate time to prepare the defense. The motion was denied and
the defendant was convicted.' 2 On appeal the court, in reversing,
found that the defendant was entitled to a reasonable time in which
to prepare the case, and on the record it could not be said that this
opportunity had been afforded.
'Common grounds for the request for a continuance are: (1) absence
of counsel for good cause, State v. Lea, 203 N.C. 13, 164 S.E. 737, cert.

denied sub nor., Davis v. North Carolina, 287 U.S. 649 (1932); (2) physical
or mental incapacity of the accused, State v. Ipock, 242 N.C. 119, 86 S.E.2d
798 (1955) ; (3) absence of a witness or evidence, State v. Parker, 234 N.C.
236, 66 S.E.2d 907 (1951), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 825 (1952) ; (4) want of
preparation on the part of counsel, State v. Parker, supra. The cases set
forth are hardly exclusive. See generally 22A C.J.S. Criminal Law §§ 480529 (1961); Annot., 84 A.L.R. 544 (1933).
8 State v. Lindsey, 78 N.C. 499 (1878).
*N.C. CoNsT. art. I, § 11; U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV. The right to
counsel and the right of confrontation are closely interrelated. North v.
People, 139 Ill. 81, 28 N.E. 996 (1891). The right to confrontation carries
with it the right to face the accuser and the opportunity to prepare a defense.
State v. Garner, 203 N.C. 361, 166 S.E. 180 (1932) ; State v. Ross, 193 N.C.
25, 136 S.E. 193 (1927). The right to counsel includes the right of that
counsel to confer with witnesses and to prepare a defense. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932). A defendant may not be brought to trial until
the right of confrontation has been met, and the duty to appoint counsel is
not discharged by the assignment of counsel at such time as to preclude the
giving of effective aid. Commonwealth v. O'Keefe, 298 Pa. 169, 148 At. 73
(1929).
" State v. Farrell, 223 N.C. 321, 26 S.E.2d 322 (1943).
11258 N.C. 349, 128 S.E.2d 389 (1962).
12 In fairness to the trial judge, it should be borne in mind that at the time

of the trial the defendant, under Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942), had
no right to court appointed counsel. The judge may have felt that having
done the defendant the favor of appointing counsel in the first place, he was
not obligated to go further and also allow a continuance. Betts v. Brady was
overruled in March, 1963, by Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
The trial here was held in March 1962.
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Prior to State v. Lane the exception to the continuance rule had
never been applied to a non-capital felony, the facts sufficient to raise
the exception having been found only in capital cases where, because
of special circumstances, it was found that counsel did not have
time in which to prepare the case. Thus in North Carolina the
accused may now appeal the denial of a continuance of any felony
case when the motion is properly based upon the right to adequate
preparation of his defense. The case is also significant because it
illustrates the increasing willingness of the court to look at the
entire circumstances of a case with a view toward determining
whether on the whole record the defendant has had a fair opportunity
to prepare his defense.
The case which first articulated the exception to the continuance
rule in North Carolina was State v. Farrell.1 3 In Farrellthe defendant was charged with rape. Counsel was appointed on Saturday. The following Monday counsel asked for time to have a psychiatrist examine the defendant. When the case was called on
Thursday the defendant moved for a continuance, contending that
a complete psychiatric examination could not be obtained, and that
family and friends were far away and could not be reached. Supporting letters to this effect were produced. The motion for continuance was denied and the defendant was found guilty. On appeal
the court said that if the issue had been guilt or innocence, ample
time had been allowed. But since the defense was insanity, three
days for preparation and investigation was insufficient, thereby violating the right of the defendant to confrontation and effectively
denying the right to counsel. The question was whether the defendant had a fair opportunity to prepare his defense, not the merits of
the particular defense.
Following Farrell the court was called upon to decide the same
issue in State v. Gibson. 4 In Gibson the defendant was indicted
for rape. Counsel was appointed at the arraignment and the trial
was scheduled for the next day. Counsel immediately moved for
a continuance stating that he did not have ample time to prepare
the case, and that the defendant should be given a complete mental
examination. Counsel could neither state the names of witnesses he
wished to call nor any special defense which he intended to use.
The motion was denied and the defendant was convicted and sen13223 N.C. 321, 26 S.E.2d 322 (1943).
1, 229 N.C. 497, 50 S.E.2d 520 (1948).
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tenced to death. On appeal the court stated that every man was
entitled to counsel and that this would amount to nothing if sufficient
time were not allowed for preparation of the defense. However, in
this case the defendant did not support his motion by affidavit or
other proof. The court found that the suggestions of counsel did
not indicate the existence of any substantial reason for the requested
postponement, and that while counsel hinted at insanity, he did not
advise the trial court that such a defense was contemplated. A mere
intangible hope that something helpful might turn up was found to
be no basis for delaying the trial since the record failed to show that
the continuance would enable counsel to obtain additional evidence
or otherwise present a stronger defense.15
The court in Gibson completely ignored the statement in Farrell
that the merits of the defense were not in question and that the only
inquiry was whether the defendant had a fair opportunity to prepare
a defense. The court seemingly required that counsel have the defense prepared immediately upon his appointment, ignoring the fact
that counsel had been appointed for that very purpose. The court
in Gibson obviously begs the question of the fair opportunity to
prepare the case which was the basis of the Farrell decision.'"
Despite the limited interpretation placed by the Gibson decision
on the manner and circumstances in which the exception to the continuance rule may be raised, there has been a trend toward the
rationale of Farrellin subsequent cases.17 The court recently stated
that while there is no rule that a case may not be tried in the same
term as the indictment is rendered, except under certain circumstances in capital cases "the more speedily a case is brought to trial,
after the offense has been committed or arrest made, the greater the
1

5Id. at 502, 50 S.E.2d at 524.
In 1949 following Gibson the Legislature enacted N.C. GEIN. STAT.
§ 15-4.1 (1950), which was designed to implement the right of confrontation,
N.C. CONsT. art. I, § 11. State v. Simpson, 243 N.C. 436, 90 S.E.2d 708
(1956). The statute provides that in any capital case where the appointment
of counsel is delayed until the term of court at which the accused is arraigned,
on motion of counsel for the accused, the case shall be continued until the
next ensuing term of criminal court.
17 See, e.g., State v. Speller, 230 N.C. 345, 53 S.E.2d 294 (1949), where
the court reversed the denial of a motion for a continuance when a special
venire drawn from outside the county was impaneled without prior notice
to either side. In a dissenting opinion in State v. Creech, 229 N.C. 662, 677,
51 S.E.2d 348, 359 (1949), Justice Barnhill stated that while the motion for
continuance was not technically within the rule of Farrell,undue haste (one
day in a murder trial), particularly in this type of case, would pervert justice as surely as unnecessary delay would defeat it.
10
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duty of the courts to determine whether or not the accused has had
a fair opportunity for trial."'
In the principal case the court followed Farrell
in a per curiam
opinion. The court not only extended the doctrine to include noncapital felonies but also allowed the exception to be taken upon an
oral motion for continuance. The case represents a significant break
from the technical distinctions laid down in Gibson with respect to
the sufficiency of the allegations necessary to come within the doctrine of State v. 1arrell.19
While the principal case provides a more liberal approach to the
request for a continuance of a criminal action on constitutional
grounds, it should be remembered that in order to take advantage
of this doctrine counsel must prepare an adequate basis for the
appeal.20 It is always necessary to allege that constitutional rights
were violated in order to preserve the appeal and come within the
exception ;2 otherwise, the court will treat the motion as one within
the discretion of the trial judge and will not normally reverse.22
Preferably the record must be made to show that the continuance
would enable counsel to obtain additional evidence or otherwise present a stronger defense.23 The statutory scheme of continuance must
be followed as nearly as possible, particularly in having written
statements and evidence, names and addresses of witnesses, and all
other possible defenses which might be urged.2 4
" State v. Graves, 251 N.C. 550, 559, 112 S.E.2d 85, 92 (1960).
0 Counsel

for the accused in Lane made an oral motion for a continuance

as did counsel for the accused in Gibson. The defense offered was much

less compelling than that offered by counsel in Gibson. The defense propounded in Lane was that defendant could not have been guilty of a crime
against nature per anum as alleged in the indictment because the defendant
had been rendered impotent as a result of the use of a "whammey," the filler
contained in a nasal inhaler.
20 State v. Farrell, 223 N.C. 321, 26 S.E.2d 322 (1943).
21
The speed of the trial does not necessarily constitute a denial of due
process. State v. Hedgebeth, 228 N.C. 259, 45 S.E.2d 563 (194.7). No standard length of time must elapse before a defendant should go on trial. Each
case and its surrounding circumstances provides its own yardstick. United
States v. Nierstheimer, 166 F.2d 87 (7th Cir. 1948).
2" State v. Creech, 229 N.C. 662, 51 S.E.2d 348 (1949).
2" State v. Gibson, 229 N.C. 497, 50 S.E.2d 520 (1948).
"2Note the similarity of the requirement for the motion as stated in
Gibson to the requirements of the ordinary continuance as set out in G.S.
§§ 1-175 to -176.
It has been held that there was no denial of due process in refusing a
continuance where a fingerprint expert could not be present at the trial, State
v. Rising, 223 N.C. 747, 28 S.E.2d 221 (1943), or where witnesses sought
to be subpoenaed could not be named by the prisoner, State v. Hackney, 240
N.C. 230, 81 S.E.2d 788 (1954), or where the defendant was merely without
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Additional significance is added to the principal case by the de-,
cision of the United States Supreme Court, in Gideon v. Wainwright 5 where the Court decreed that counsel must be provided in
criminal cases.26 Since all accused now have the right to counsel,
the corollary right to adequate opportunity to prepare the defense
While State v. Lane and Gideon v. Wainwright
is also extended.
are large steps forward in the protection of the rights of those
accused of non-capital crimes, there are many problems which remain
unanswered. The courts have the duty both to provide the defendant
a speedy trial and to clear overcrowded trial dockets. A continuance
in every case could frustrate the speed of justice and cause administrative turmoil and unnecessary delay. On the other hand, appointment of counsel to represent indigent defendants will involve all
members of the bar, including those who do not deal primarily with
criminal cases. As a result continuance to allow proper preparation
by attorneys will be essential in carrying out the purposes of such
an appointment.
As the principal case held, the immediate solution to the problem
has been to make the denial of continuance appealable. The most
obvious alternative solution to the problem would be a statute similar
to G.S. § 15-4.1 which would provide for an automatic continuance,
in proper circumstances, upon motion of counsel. However, statutory procedures alone can never fully satisfy due process in every
case. Ultimately the solution must lie in an increased awareness of
this problem and a sympathetic treatment of the indigent by the trial
judiciary. It is believed that the trial judges, having been apprised
of the problem as presented in the principal case, are equal to the
Tom D. EFIRD
task.
Damages-Collateral Source Rule-Pensions as Reducing Factor on
Personal Injury

In Browning v. The War Office1 the English Court of Appeal
considered the question of reducing an award for damages by the
friends or relatives nearby to be at the trial to testify in his behalf, State v.
228 N.C. 259, 45 S.E.2d 563 (1947).
Hedgebeth,
25
372 U.S. 335 (1963).
28

In Gideon v. Wainwright the Court did not expressly extend the deci-

sion to cover all criminal prosecutions, but certainly all felonies are included
within the rule.
, Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
[1963] 2 Weekly L R. 52 (C.A.).

